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Abstract
Generally, in block ciphers that follow the Substitution Permuta-
tion Networks strategy, the round transformation include a non-linear
substitution, a linear diffusion and the key addition components. Most
of the research has been focused on the design of the substitution in
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order to strengthen the cipher against the linear and differential crypt-
analysis. But in ciphers similar to Rijndael, the focus is more towards
the diffusion component. The goal of this project is to experiment with
the linear transformation that is unique to Rijndael in the context of
differential analysis. The analysis in this project will be on the reduced
round variants of the cipher. The ciphers that we take for our experi-
ment are the Rijndael with no diffusion at all and the Rijndael with a
weakened diffusion component. Although this is the final objective of
the project, we will begin with and spend a reasonable amount of ef-
fort with the implementation and the differential cryptanalysis of the
standard substitution permutation networks (SPN). Then the same
analysis will be extended to the reduced round variant of the Rijndael.
1 Background
This section gives some important definitions with short descriptions that
will help understanding the structure of Rijndael. The important security
aspects behind the design is also discussed at the end of each section.
The Rijndael algorithm, a symmetric key cryptosystem and iterated key
block cipher system, designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen, was
selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the year 2000 by
the National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST). Most of the AES-
competitors were, although secure with respect to several aspects, ruled out
for one or more of the reasons [22]. Rijndael was evaluated to be relatively
best in all aspects analyzed and expected. Lots of research has been done on
the line of cryptanalysis of Rijndael since before the days it was presented
as a candidate for AES. As a result of these research, one could say that
Rijndael is secure. As Rijndael is well designed taking the known attacks
into consideration and shown by many recent publications on the analysis
of Rijndael, it is stated by the researchers that Rijndael would survive for a
reasonable years to come. The important aspects of this project are
• The implementation and differential analysis of the substitution per-
mutation networks (SPN) cipher
• The SPN implementation will be generalized so that the analysis can
be performed efficiently
• The same analysis is extended onto the reduced round variant(s) of
Rijndael. There are various possible modifications that can be applied
on the reduced round variant. We choose few of them that will be
meaningful in our context. A few target ciphers are
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– Rijndael without either the shift-rows and/or the mix-columns
component
– Rijndael with shift-rows component altered to minimize the dif-
fusion effect
– Rijndael with mix-columns component altered to minimize the
diffusion effect
– All the above possibilities will be analyzed also by varying the
strength of s-boxes.
All of our analysis will be on the reduced round variants. In the following
subsections we introduce the Rijndael algorithm briefly.
1.1 Block Ciphers
In this paper, the term cipher means the corresponding cryptographic al-
gorithm. A block cipher is a set of boolean transformations operating on
nb-bit vectors (which are called blocks) [12]. In other words, a block cipher
transforms plaintext blocks of a fixed length nb-bit to cipher text blocks of
the same length under the influence of a cipher key k. Usually the boolean
transformation of the block ciphers is divided into three layers namely sub-
stitution, diffusion and key mixing. This transformation is key-dependent.
The size of the key may determine the number of transformations. In gen-
eral, the security of this kind of system is achieved by repeatedly applying
the transformation. In block ciphers, the input message will be divided into
plaintext blocks whose size is equal to the block-size of the cipher. In Data
Encryption Standard [DES], the predecessor to AES, the block size is 64
bits. In Rijndael we have 3 variable block sizes namely 128, 192 and 256,
whereas AES (as chosen and published by NIST) has restricted the block
size only to 128 bits [8].
1.2 Iterative and Iterated Block Ciphers
In iterative block ciphers, the transformations are iterated many times. Each
iteration is called a round, and the corresponding transformation is called
the round transformation. The round transformations are key-dependent.
Each round transformation may or may not be unique and different from
the cipher’s other round transformations. Each round will have a different
key, and the round keys are computed from the cipher key [7]. The algo-
rithm used to derive the individual round keys from the cipher key is called
the key schedule algorithm. If the iterative block cipher has same round
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AddRoundKey
state = X + K
SubBytes ShiftRows
AddRoundKey
state =Y (ciphertext block)
SubBytes AddRoundKey
ShiftRows MixColumns
One round transformation (repeated Nr-1 times)
Nr: Number of rounds
state = Xi + Ki
state = X (plaintext block)
i-th round key : Ki
Initial key
Figure 1: Encryption
transformation for all the rounds (except the first and the last rounds which
may be slightly different), then the cipher is called the iterated block cipher
[7].
1.3 Key Alternating Ciphers
In this type of ciphers, the round transformation has no involvement of the
key. The cipher is considered as an alternated application of the round
transformation and the key addition. Usually, the key addition is the simple
XOR operation [7].
1.4 Rijndael: A Short Definition
Rijndael belongs to the type of key-alternating block ciphers. It is defined
as given below.
B[K] = f(Kr) • p(r) • f(Kr−1) • p(r − 1) • ... • f(K1) • p(1) • f(K0),
where f(Ki) is the i
th round key addition and the p(i) is the ith round
transformation. We present further details about the round transformation
in the next sub section [7].
We will discuss the design of Rijndael tuned to our further insights, that
is, we present the security issues behind the design of each component in
their respective sections. Above is the diagram that represents the basic
structure of the encryption process in Rijndael [Figure 1]. The block size
(note that the plain text is divided into blocks), the key size and the number
of rounds are suggested as follows. In Rijndael algorithm, the block sizes
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can be 128, 192 and 256 bits. The allowable key sizes are 128 bits, 192 bits
and 256 bits. And the number of rounds respective to the key sizes are 10,
12 and 14 [21]. We briefly explain what every functional component is for.
For the experimental purpose of this project, 128-bit block and 128-bit key
size will be used.
2 Rijndael: An introduction
2.1 General terminologies and concepts
State, Plaintext Block and the Ciphertext Block The state is an
intermediate result of the cipher. The input is mapped to a state (which
is called the initial state) and the output is mapped from the result state.
State is viewed as a two dimensional matrix of bytes. The row is fixed to 4
in order to gain good performance in hardware implementations, especially
in 32 bit architectures. The number of columns, which is denoted as Nb,
varies according to the input block size and will be 4 if the block size is 128
bits(16 bytes), 5 if the block size if 192 bits(20 bytes) and 6 if the block size
is 256 bits(24 bytes). The key is also viewed as the state. The plaintext
block, which may be 16 or 20 or 24 bytes, is denoted by p0,p1,p2,...,p(4.Nb−1).
Similarly the cipher text block is denoted by c0,c1,c2,...,c(4.Nb−1). And the
state is denoted by ai,j , 0 < i < 4, 0 < j < Nb. Where ai,j denotes the
byte in row i and column j. The input bytes p0,p1,p2,...,p4.Nb−1 are mapped
to the state bytes in the order a0,0, a1,0, a2,0, a3,0, a0,1, a1,1, a2,1, a3,1, ... .
Algebraic Nature of Rijndael The algebraic nature of Rijndael is of fi-
nite fields [16, 3]. The components of Rijndael can also be defined in the field
GF(2), while this is not true in the case of other block ciphers. In Rijndael,
the bytes of the input are considered as polynomials in the field GF(28).
There are two operations that are basically necessary for the algorithm, ad-
dition and multiplication of polynomials. Addition of polynomials is simply
the addition of corresponding coefficients modulo 2 [27, 15]. Multiplication
of polynomials has to be reduced to a polynomial of degree lesser than 8,
for it is in GF(28). The irreducible polynomial chosen for this purpose is x8
+ x4 + x3 + x + 1 [7]. With this irreducible polynomial, the representa-
tion for the field GF(28) is constructed. Examples for polynomial addition
and multiplication are given below. The coefficients of the polynomials in
GF(28) can be either 0 or 1.
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Addition
(x7 + x5 + x4 + x + 1) + (x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + 1) = (x7 + x3 + x)
Multiplication
(x5 + x3 + 1) ∗ (x6 + x4 + 1) = (x11 + x9 + x5 + x9 + x7 + x3 + x6 + x4 + 1)
= (x11 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1) (mod x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1) = (x5 + x3 + 1)
Security margin of a cipher and other security measures For a
cipher specified with n rounds, if there exists a successful cryptanalytic
attack (successful in the sense, the attack algorithm should be faster than
the exhaustive key search) against a reduced-round version of the cipher
with k rounds, the cipher then is said to have an absolute security margin
of n-k rounds or a relative security margin of (n−k)
n
[7]. There are other
quantitative measures that may also be taken to determine the strength
of the cipher like finding lower bounds on th respect to the complexity
of specific attacks, finding the maximum input-output correlation in the
context of the linear cryptanalysis and etc.[7, 23].
2.2 Components of Rijndael
AddRoundKey [S ′ = S + K] This component takes a state as the input
and XORs it with the Key. All the rounds of Rijndael can use the same
key or different keys. The decision whether to use same key or different
keys for all the rounds is discussed in the reference [7]. This AddRoundKey
operation can be represented as the addition of matrices.
SubBytes This component is similar to the substitution in Substitution
Permutation Networks (SPN) cipher in the sense that it is substitution [12].
The substitution in SPN has no linear or algebraic definition, whereas the
substitution in Rijndael is defined algebraically [7]. Linearity is there if
and only if f(A + B) = f(A) + f(B). Anyone can easily verify that the
other components are linear in nature The nonlinearity property is proved
to be a strong cryptographic primitive [21]. The other desirable properties
stated by the authors in the paper [12] are invertibility, minimization of the
largest non-trivial correlation between linear combinations of input bits and
linear combination of output bits, minimization of the largest non-trivial
value in the EX-OR table, complexity of its algebraic expression in GF(28)
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Operation in GF (2)
11001010binary
to
field   7      6       3
X + X + X + 1
   8      4       3
X + X + X + X + 1
 inverse over
   multiplicative  6    4    3
X + X + X + 1
Figure 2: Substitution
any block cipher to be secure against the attacks that are already known,
especially the linear and differential cryptanalysis.
The functionality of S-Box includes operations in GF(28) and operations
in GF(2). [GF: Galois or Finite Field]4,2]. Note that the S-Box takes a
byte as input and it has two sub components. The first one is finding the
multiplicative inverse of the field representation of the input byte. As it is a
simple algebraic expression by itself, it is possible to mount algebraic attacks
like interpolation attack, so it is followed by an affine transformation, prop-
erly chosen in order to make the SubBytes a complex algebraic expression,
but preserving the non linearity property as a whole. The functionality of
the s-box of Rijndael is given in Figure 2. The diagram is illustrated with
an example.
As the legendary attacks due to linear and differential cryptanalysis ex-
ploit the input-output correlation and the propagation of the differences
(which is the XOR of selected bits of the input and output) to extract the
partial or whole bits of the keys respectively, in order to secure the cipher
against the attacks related to these cryptanalysis, the non linearity of the
S-Box should satisfy few properties. They are, the maximum input output
correlation and the difference propagation probability should be minimum to
the extent possible. The substitution component of Rijndael is having these
properties at the maximum optimum level. Also the SubBytes component
can be implemented as a table look-up operation to gain speed and to pre-
clude timing and differential power attacks. Decryption can be achieved by
reversing the steps of the algorithm with few exceptions and with inverted
components. As this project concentrate mainly in diffusion characteris-
tics, this component has no significant role other than it is an important
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component worth mentioning for it is enforcing the non-linearity, a required
primitive, and for the understanding of the whole cipher. There is no specific
issues to be discussed for the 128 bit block and key sizes in this component.
ShiftRows [Permutation of bytes at row level] This function is a
simple permutation or it is sometimes called transposition. The main func-
tion of this layer is to diffuse (spread) the changes made at the SubBytes
layer. The diffusion should be well optimized to give resistance against the
linear and differential cryptanalysis. The ShiftRows layer operates on row
level of the state. The permutation is achieved here by shifting the rows
cyclically over different offsets. The four rows should have different offsets.
And the shift offsets for various block lengths are given in the reference [8].
The choice of the shift offsets matters in case of the algorithm’s strength
against differential and saturation attacks. So in Rijndael, the simplest and
the strong options are been chosen for the offsets. For the target block
length of 128 bytes, the first row is not shifted, but the second by one left
shift, third by two and fourth row by three left shifts.
In this project we will be changing the offsets in order to easily per-
form the differential analysis and will step into finding the difference (in the
strength level) between various optimal offset options.
MixColumns [Permutation at column level] This is an important
component worth attention. The sub-bytes component, we discussed before,
is actually changing the bytes and this local byte change is diffused (spread)
further with the help of the mix-columns operation. This diffusion is one
of the three cryptographic primitives desired [16]. As we already discussed,
this mix-columns layer and the shift-rows layer together contributes to the
diffusion. This permutation is a complete algebraic one as what we see.
Each column of the input state is considered as a polynomial over GF(28)
and it is multiplied modulo X4 +1 with a fixed polynomial C(X)
C(X) =′ 03′x3 +′ 01′x2 +′ 01′x +′ 02′
Although the polynomial X4 +1 is not irreducible, Rijndael chooses
the polynomial C(X) to be co-prime to X4 + 1, and so the operation is
invertible inorder to perform decryption [28]. Another interesting fact is the
coefficients of both the polynomial C(x) and the polynomial of a column of
the state are by itself polynomials in GF (28). So if we take the 0th column
of the state, it is
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a30x3 + a20x2 + a10x + a00
It is now a polynomial in GF(28). In the pursuit of mixing columns, it
is multiplied by the polynomial C[x] modulo x4 + 1 to get the result
b30x3 + b20x2 + b10x + b00
Note that the coefficients of the polynomials are themselves polynomials
in GF(28) , as we discussed earlier. For example, the coefficient ’03’ in C(x)
is actually the hexadecimal representation of a byte, and is nothing but the
polynomial x+1.
The multiplication by C(x) modulo x4 + 1 can also be represented as a
matrix transformation. For example if we take the 0th column, which has
four bytes (a00, a10, a20, a30), the MixColumns layer does the following to
get the the 0th column of the result (b00, b10, b20, b30). Similarly the operation
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The choice of the coefficients has two advantages, they are simple like
03, 02 and 01 in order to gain easy implementation in hardware (Since
multiplication by ’02’ or by x is just the multiplication by polynomial x,
which is a left shift modulo the (Rijndael) polynomial and multiplication by
01 has no processing at all) and also they are chosen to give optimal diffusion
in order to preclude differential and linear cryptanalysis [7]. In this layer
also, care was and should be taken to fix the cycles per execution in the
implementation to avoid timing and power attacks. Because in ordinary
implementation, if any of the shift operation involved (in order to multiply
by ’02’) leads to overflow and additional operation, then the cycle time
will vary [24]. But there are many implementation methods suggested and
can be followed to avoid these attacks. In this project we will carry out
the differential analysis either by modifying the constants or by completely
removing this layer in order to minimize the optimality of the diffusion.
Key Scheduling Every round has a different key, where each round key is
derived from the cipher’s original key. The key schedule algorithm has two
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subcomponents. First one is the key expansion which is used to derive the
expanded key from the cipher key. The expanded key is the concatenation
of the individual round keys. The second subcomponent is the round key
selection, where in simple to sophisticated ways to select the round keys
can be accomplished. But Rijndael has the simple key selection procedure.
Nonlinearity, diffusion and symmetry elimination are achieved to avoid some
specific kind of attacks [7]. Nonlinearity is achieved by using the same sub-
bytes component, and diffusion is used to efficiently spread the cipher key
differences into the expanded key and the symmetry elimination is achieved
by using a different constant in generating each round key.
2.3 Other important aspects
Following are some other aspects that are important in the context of the
design of Rijndael. The following is a brief summary of the discussion by
designers in their book [7].
Simplicity and Symmetry Simplicity is maintained in the design of ev-
ery component of the algorithm, which is one of the characteristic imposed
by the NIST and expected by everyone from the level of the users to crypt-
analysts. Rijndael designers have considered the simplicity in two aspects.
One is the specification simplicity and the other one is analysis simplicity.
Simplicity in specification or analysis should not be misunderstood by con-
cluding that the simplicity would contribute to some weakness. It is rather
working in the opposite way in the case of Rijndael. In the absence of suc-
cessful cryptanalysis, as everyone would understand out of its simplicity, it
will appeal to the credibility of the algorithm. As the simplicity in analysis
offers, Rijndael has the ability to demonstrate the way in which the Cipher
is strong against known and possible attacks. Although simplicity can be
achieved in many ways, Rijndael has achieved it by choosing the symmetry
in its components and the choice of their operations. The algorithm has
lot of symmetry which is one of the measure taken to achieve the simplic-
ity. Symmetry means each bits of the plaintext is treated similarly in the
algorithm. Symmetry is accomplished across the rounds, within the round
transformation and in the steps of the round. There is an attack, which is
called Slide Attack [1], that exploits the symmetry of any block cipher. The
weakness of this attack is: it demands significant symmetry even in the key
schedule of the (Iterative) block ciphers[7]. In Rijndael, round constants are
used in getting the key for each round. This is one of the simplest ways
to eliminate the symmetry in the key schedule. There exists a good bundle
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alignment (where a bundle is a group of bits that are together processed as
a unit in any component of the layer) to achieve the symmetry. This align-
ment property is exploited by the so called saturation (or square) attack,
but fortunately because of its high complexity, it is feasible efficiently only
till six rounds.
Because of the symmetry and alignment properties, it was easy to prove
the lower bounds for the complexity of any attacks and to find the maximum
difference propagation probability and the maximum input-output correla-
tion, which is not the case in other ciphers which have sophisticated and
complicated round transformation [7].
Global and Local optimizations Local optimization concerns the op-
timization and security measures taken in the round transformation, rather
the global optimization is about getting good properties like diffusion at the
overall cipher level, in fact the latter deals with the sequence of rounds rather
than a single round. Local optimization concentrates on a round transfor-
mation, where to obtain non-linearity and diffusion at the local level, the
maximum input-output correlation is minimized to the extent possible in
the context of linear cryptanalysis and the maximum difference propagation
probability is minimized in the context of differential cryptanalysis. Most
of the available block ciphers are designed with good local optimization.
Specific and unique in the design of Rijndael is the designers have given
significant consideration to the global optimization, in this regard, Wide
Trail Strategy is an almost unique and an efficient approach taken [7]. The
important benefits of targeting the global optimization are cheap non-linear
boolean transformations such as small S-Boxes [7]. Also it favors to specify
not what the block ciphers should satisfy, but give concrete criteria for the
design of components of the round transformation, where the criteria mostly
are having diffusion and non-linear components.
2.4 Differential Cryptanalysis
General information Differential cryptanalysis, along with the linear
analysis [27, 12], was the well-known chosen-plaintext attack [16] and a
successful analysis against the block ciphers. There are two characteristics
that the differential analysis exploits from the block ciphers. They are the
lack of optimal non-linearity and lack of good diffusion. The main technique
behind this analysis is finding the s-boxes which are active. An active s-box is
the one that has one or more high probable differentials. The two important
terms used in this analysis are the differential and the difference [12]. The
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difference is the exclusive-or operation of the bits (either input or output
bits). Let us denote the output difference, which is the exclusive-or of the
selected output bits of the chosen s-box, as DY . And the input difference
which is denoted as DX . Then the differential is a pair (DX , DY ), such that
the probability that this DY occurs given this DX is much greater than the
1/2n, where n is the number of bits (of the input or the block size in other
words) involved[12].
In the analyses of a cipher with many rounds, we construct a differen-
tial (DX ,DY ) involving plaintext bits and the bits of the input to the last
round of the cipher. We denote the i-th round differential as (DXi, Dyi].
We construct the differentials of the whole cipher after constructing the se-
quence of high probable differentials from the active s-boxes. We construct
the sequence as (DX1,DY 1), (DX2,DY 2), ..., (DXn,DY n), such that the per-
muted Dyi is equal to DXi+1 and it should be such that every differential
pair should have almost high probability. The key bits get cancelled and
so it wouldnot come in the differential expression [12]. The whole sequence
is just the concatenation of appropriate differential pairs of s-boxes across
the rounds. With this overall differential, it is highly possible to recover a
subset of the subkey bits following the last round [27].
Linear transformation It is to be noted that although the non-linear
substitution (confusion) layer contributes to the strength of the cipher against
the differential analysis, the linear transformation of the algorithm, the per-
mutation, increases the resistance to differential analysis [13]. From the
research done on the design on S-boxes relative to the known attacks, it was
found that large S-boxes should be chosen, which will take lot of resources
in the implementation. So in the design of Rijndael and other related cipher
which follow the wide-trail strategy, large resources are rather spent in the
linear transformation to provide high multiple- round diffusion [7].
Rijndael by itself is well designed against these analysis, and it is proved
strong against this analyses because of its good non-linearity and diffusion
optimized both locally and globally. In the pursuit of finding the role of
the diffusion in Rijndael, this project includes minimizing the diffusion by
the techniques that we already discussed in the corresponding sections and
applying this analysis. he reasons we focus mainly on diffusion is due to
the fact that in the design of Rijndael, the strength against the differential
analysis is unusually gained more through the linear step rather than the
non-linear step.
12
3 Project description and its outcomes
As we discussed earlier at the end of the sections related to shift-rows and
the mix-columns components, this project is to analyse the diffusion layer,
and may lead to the following conclusions.
3.1 Goals
• Build the standard substitution permutation network [SPN] according
to the tutorial by professor Hayes [12]
• Perform the differential analysis to understand the pros and cons of
s-boxes and the diffusion in this context
• Extend the above analysis to the reduced round variants of Rijndael
• Describe the importance of both the diffusion components (separately
and also as together) through some quantitative results that we get
from our analysis
• Discuss about the possible weak choices of the offsets in the shift-rows
component and the coefficients of the polynomial C(x), which are the
important entities of this diffusion layer, that determine the strength
of the Cipher
3.2 Main discussion of the project
There are lot of previous research done along this line and the authors have
defined how to construct an efficient key-alternating structure with optimal
diffusion [7]. One of the main aims of this project is to experiment this. In
this subsection, we briefly discussed the works involved in the project. The
project will also include and discuss other interesting aspects that might
arise as a result of the mainstream. To achieve this, the project has several
steps.
• First of all, to get a good understanding of the differential analysis and
possibly its variations, this project includes an implementation of the
simple block cipher Substitution Permutation Network (SPN), which
is extensively used for academic research. In fact, the purpose of this
implementation of SPN is to carry out differential analysis on the SPN
cipher according to the references [27, 12]. The implementation will
include a program which will do this and the same can be used for
learning the practical aspects of the simple differential analysis.
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• Setting up the implementation of (ANSI-C) Rijndael provided by the
National Institute of Standards Institute. This implementation will
be studied well enough to modify the number of rounds and to fix the
block and key size to 128-bits. The number of rounds for our analysis
will be around 4 to 6. Because the best known attacks are succeeded
till 7 rounds.
• Analyse with respect to the shift-rows layer in the context of both the
differential analyses and its variations possibly. Here we may pursue
to change the offsets used in the shift-rows component and make these
analyses possible. The cipher we use here will be the one without the
mix-columns layer. So we use the shift-rows component as the only
contribution to the diffusion.
• Analyse the mix-columns layer in detail enough to figure out the pos-
sibilities of introducing (or finding) weakness into it either by altering
the layer to reduce the diffusion or by removing the layer. Here we may
attempt to choose different coeffiecients of C(x) or a different polyno-
mial C(x) to make the differential analysis feasible. It is a fact that
even though the round transformation used provides low non-linearity
or diffusion, repeating the rounds often enough will result in a block
cipher that is unbreakable against the linear and differential cryptanal-
ysis [7]. So we will try to carry out the analysis in a reduced round
altered version of the cipher. This will help to determine the strength
(security margin) of the altered cipher quantitatively with respect to
the changes that we make.
• Analyse a cipher that has both the components in it and with knowl-
edge that we gain from the previous analyses.
• As there is a significant consideration given to the linear transforma-
tion with respect to the Wide trail strategy, our analysis may also
involve setting the s-boxes weaker and do the possible analyses that
are above mentioned.
4 Projected Schedule
This project is expected to be completed in a duration of two quarters. The
tentative schedule of the project is presented below.
Sep 1-7, SPN Implementation : SPN as given in the tutorial by Pro-
fessor Howard M Heys or by Prof. Stinson will be implemented
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Sep 8-27, Differential analysis: The differential analysis is further stud-
ied and applied on the SPN already implemented, and a report will be
prepared based on this
Sep 28 to Oct 25, Study of diffusion components: This step involves
the study of mathematics behind the Wide trail strategy and the role
of linear diffusion layer in this wide trail strategy
Oct 26 to Nov 8, Implementation: As we discussed earlier, there are
lot of possibilites for the target cipher. We finalise the possibilites and
implement each of them for analysis.
Nov 23 to Dec 20, Carrying out the analysis: This is part I of the
analysis, and if we encounter any significant changes to what we planned,
we update our further analysis accordingly
Dec 28 to Jan 24, carrying out further analysis: This is part II of the
analysis
Jan 25 to Feb 21, Document and report preparation: This step of the
project may include final analysis stages besides the main report prepa-
ration
Feb 23 to Feb 29, Defense: The project will be defended during this week
5 SPN and Differential Analysis
References
[1] Alex Biryukov, David Wagner, Slide Attacks, EUROCRYPT 2000, Inter-
national Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptograhic Tech-
niques, March 2000 proceedings
[2] Lawrence Brown, Jennifer Seberry, On the design of permutation P in
DES type cryptosystems
[3] Jung Hee Cheon, Munju Kim, Kwangjo Kim,Jung-Yeun Lee, and Sung-
Woo Kang, Improved Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Rijndael
and Crypton, Springer series
[4] Nicolas T Courtois and Josef Piepryzk, Cryptanalysis of block ciphers
with overdefined systems of equations, IACR eprint server, 2002. Also
available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/044
15
[5] Cryptography by Nicolas T Courtois, www.minrank.org/aes
[6] AES page by Evan Damgaar, www.cryptomathic.com/company/aes.html
[7] Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, The Design of Rijndael. AES - The
Advanced Encryption Standard, Springer
[8] Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, AES Proposal, (2000)
[9] Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, Answers to new observations on Rijn-
dael, August 11, 2000
[10] Neils Ferguson, John Kesley, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneir, M.Stay,
D.Wagner, David Wagner, and Doug Whiting, Improved Cryptanalysis
of Rijndael, Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption - FSE’00, number
1978 in Lecture notes in Computer Science. Pages 213-230. Springer-
Verlag, 2000
[11] Niels Ferguson, Richard Schroeppel, and Doug Whiting, A Simple alge-
braic representation of Rijndael, Proceedings of Selected areas in Cryp-
tography - SAC’01, number 2259 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 103-111. Springer-Verlag, 2001
[12] Howard M Heys, A Tutorial on Linear and differential Cryptanalysis
[13] Howard M Heys, Substitution-Permutation Networks resistant to dif-
ferential and linear cryptanalysis, Journal of cryptology (1996) 9:1-19
[14] Thomas Jakobsen and Lars R Knudsen, The Interpolation Attack on
Block Ciphers
[15] Rudolf Lidl and Harald Neiederreiter, Introduction to Finite Fields and
their Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1986
[16] Alfred J Menezes, Paul C Van Oorschot and Scott A Vanstone, Hanbook
of Applied Cryptograhy CRC press, Fifth print, Augus 2001
[17] Sean Murphy and M J B Robshaw, Essential Algebraic Structure Within
the AES, Information security Group, University of London, UK
[18] Sean Murphy and Matt Robshaw, New Observations on Rijndael, In-
formation Security Group, University of London, UK
[19] Modes of AES: www.csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes
16
[20] Elisabeth Oswald, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, AES - The State
of the Art of Rijndael’s Security, October 30, 2002
[21] Bart Preneel, Vincent Rijmen, and Antoon Bosselaers, Recent Devel-
opments in the Design of Conventional Cryptographic Algorithms, 18
September 1998
[22] Dhiren R Patel, The AES winner, AES third conference
[23] Sangwoo Park, Soo Hak Sung, Seongtaek Chee, E-Joong yoon, and
Jongin Lim, on the security of Rindael-Like structures against differential
and linear cryptanalysis, Advances in Cryptology, 2002
[24] Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Francois Koeune, A timing attack against
Rijndael, June 10, 1999
[25] Rijndael specific, www.rijndael.com
[26] Rijndael designer’s page, www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/rijmen/rijndael.
[27] Douglas R Stinson, Cryptography Theory and Practice 2nd edition,
CRC Press
[28] Michael Welschenbach, Cryptography in C and C++, Apress.
17
